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From the beginning of the political transition in Hungary the changes and developments affecting sport 
did not occur in a premeditated fashion, but instead more as the associated results of certain economic, so-
cial and political events. As a result of the political transition, one of the most important factors in Hunga-
ry’s lag in football talent development seems to be the weakness in management. The positions of talent de-
velopment are best in the independent talent development (junior) clubs mostly because these clubs have no 
senior teams and therefore all attention is paid to the youth. The lack of success of the past 20 years or so 
in this sport clearly shows that Hungarian football is heading in the wrong direction. It is time to approach 
the issue of talent development in Hungarian football in a different manner. In this paper, we provide sug-
gestions for improvement. 
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Introduction
The presentation of national sport policy 
traditions and the corresponding consideration of 
possible directions, and their systematic comparison 
altogether can provide a truly suffi cient foundation 
for understanding the present sporting life of various 
nations (Chalip, Johnson, & Stachura, 1996). It may 
be generally stated that there is no international 
sport policy standard which the post-socialist 
nations have adopted without alteration (Földesiné, 
1996a; Krawczyk, 1992). By the beginning of the 
1990s the various national (generally governmental) 
sport policies bore the marks of several decades 
of transformation and search for direction. Even 
in the more developed countries there have not 
been governmental and political sport strategies 
and concepts which could be copied automatically 
by those interested (Földesiné, 1996 b, c). During 
the greatly weakened dictatorship of the 1980s and 
1990s in Eastern Europe, when changes in other 
areas of society accelerated, there were not really 
any grassroots initiatives in sport (Földesiné & 
Egressy, 2005). It is worth noting that from the 
beginning of the political transitions the changes 
and developments effecting sport did not occur 
in a premeditated fashion, but instead more as 
the associated results of the economic, social and 
political events (Frenkl & Gallov, 2002; Hédi & 
Földesi, 2004). The period following the political 
transitions has proved in a lot of instances that the 
open funding of sport is clearly not in the interest 
of companies functioning as sponsors using state 
fi nances (Nyerges & Laki, 2006).
Based on the previously said it seems that in its 
present state Hungarian sport is incapable of func-
tioning independently without state support. Hun-
gary has been unable to qualify for international top 
competitions in classical spectator sports (football, 
basketball and tennis); the best results have been 
achieved in the fi elds less preferred by the media 
and sponsors (kayak-canoe, fencing and the mod-
ern pentathlon) (Freyer, 2004). 
It is evident that the standard of Hungarian foot-
ball is falling year by year (Frenkl, 2003; Szegedi, 
2003). It is also demonstrable that those involved in 
football (coaches, players, league captains, the sport 
press, a section of the fans) all see the same road 
progress as a signifi cant rise in the capital invested 
in the fi eld and, at least as important, the upgrading 
of the role of young talent (Krausz, 2002). 
Talent identifi cation had been operating since 
the conception of organized competitive sport. East-
ern block countries tended to have state-run, sys-
tematic talent identifi cation (Bompa, 1996). Bompa 
also states that talent development is advantageous 
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for the individual athlete, coaches, and the sport. 
Football, however, for some time did not 
become a profession, and truly “big business” and 
therefore there was no need for the sport managers 
or the clubs, as if racing with time, to try to involve 
younger players and raise trained football players. 
The Hungarian clubs began to involve secondary 
school students fi rst in the 1930s, later ever younger 
players. The sport’s international results in the 
1970s showed that in an organized and systematic 
framework it is suffi cient to involve children at the 
age of 10-12 years, or even older. Today in Hungary 
children’s football is a distinctly new phenomenon 
and furthermore it has begun to become generally 
accepted in Hungary (in the 1990s) as the sport has 
become professional.
The purpose of this study was to examine the 
progress and the characteristics of Hungarian foot-
ball and of its talent development after the politi-
cal transition of the late 1980s. As the 1989-90 po-
litical transition brought about critical changes in 
the relationship between sport and society, our aim 
was to study the resulting professional, economic, 
sociological and sociopolitical effects, specifi cally 
on talent development for the most popular sport 
in the country. Based on the study our stated goal 
was to sketch out, if only cautiously, a prospective 
as well.
Methods
As learning and understanding the character-
istic marks of a given social group, and exploring 
their correlation is considered a scientifi c study, we 
turned to complex qualitative methods for a guide 
(Babbie, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Since 
there are no prior empirical studies available in 
this specifi c area of research, besides meaning, an 
exploratory factor dominated this study. Accord-
ing to Patton (2002), qualitative research is inquiry 
into meaning and exploration, hence, in this study 
through fi eldwork, document analysis and in-depth 
interviews we focused on what things meant and 
how they affected Hungarian talent development 
in football. Qualitative data collection and analy-
sis progressed hand-in-hand, their integration and 
building upon one another were present throughout 
the entire process (Creswell, 1997; Miles & Huber-
man, 1994). 
Fieldwork 
The fi rst author of this study has devoted 
his entire life to football. As a football player, 
coach and politician he has worked actively on a 
continuous basis for the growth and advancement 
of the sport. As a participatory observer he has 
lived and continues to live together with the 
football community and directly and continuously 
takes part in its daily activities. He is not merely 
present at the events, but has worked with and for 
the football community. He constantly collects 
and analyses data. His presence and activity have 
always been lead by the intent to improve, the entire 
football community has accepted him, placed their 
confi dence in him and therefore he has been able to 
collect information fi rsthand.
Document analysis
The systematic examination of the printed and 
written materials played an important role in the 
study. It was important to examine documents, be-
cause they provided a behind the scenes view of a 
lot of aspects that might have not been available 
through other means of data collection (Tenenbaum 
& Driscoll, 2005). First and foremost we gained ac-
cess to all public and private recorded documents 
(archive sources) related to football following the 
political transition. The direction and management 
of the sport produces a huge amount of documents 
and among these we found interesting and impor-
tant sources as related decrees, acts, accounts, com-
mittee meeting reports which were all taken into 
account during our research. Decisions on the di-
rection and development of sport at all levels were 
signifi cant for the study.
In-depth interviews
In the interest of achieving the most complete 
answers to the goals outlined we prepared two-hour 
indepth interviews with decisive personalities in 
football, who possess experience and indispensa-
ble information on the state of football. During the 
selection of samples reliable professionals accept-
ed in the sport were chosen and prepared based on 
these in-depth interviews: 14 defi nitive profession-
als (coaches, league captains), 6 former directors 
of the Hungarian Football Federation (HFF) (these 
directors played decisive roles in the development 
of the sport) and 3 “living legends” in football. All 
interviews were recorded, which provided indis-
pensable assistance in the analysis.
Results
Let us fi rst describe the situation of talent de-
velopment in Hungarian football. The assessment 
was carried out using Szegedi’s classifi cation (2003) 
of the following club types: professional, amateur 
associations and independent talent development 
clubs.
The main goal of the professional associations 
is to train highly trained valuable players for 
maximum profi t. If these trained players later 
reinforce an adult team, then the club’s budget 
is spared from buying players trained elsewhere 
(here, therefore, profi t is directly apparent). A club 
may sell a player thereby generating a profi t. It is 
a fact that there are very few capital-rich owners 
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who think in the long-term in Hungarian football. It 
seems clear that the position of talent development 
is in general poor in the hierarchy of the larger 
profi t-oriented clubs. Talent development in many 
places is neither organizationally nor economically 
independent from the company managing the club 
and there the adult professional teams are treated 
exceptionally. The position of talent development 
is not only simply poor within the system, but also 
the club’s internal structure makes it diffi cult to take 
advantage of external fi nancial resources. 
The situation of talent development is signifi -
cantly better in the smaller, amateur associations. 
These clubs do not “produce for the market”, i.e. it 
is not their goal to raise truly quality football play-
ers but instead, in connection to talent development, 
they organize recreational activities for young foot-
ball players. Their other goal is to raise footballers 
for their own clubs: the percentage of own trained 
football players in these associations is signifi cantly 
higher than in professional organizations. The man-
agement of talent development is not separate from 
the adult team; however, the local government (in 
contrast to the professional clubs) can be more con-
fi dent because it is supporting the physical activity 
of local children.
The third type of club is the independent tal-
ent development clubs. The greatest advantage of 
these clubs is that most came about as grassroots 
civil initiatives and therefore they are not compelled 
to struggle with managing a large team nor do they 
have to blaze a trail in a “fossilized” club structure. 
The clubs following the political transition were 
formed by people who were for some reason dis-
satisfi ed with the (primarily) professional associa-
tions in their football community. Amongst the in-
dependent talent development clubs there are those 
which parents formed because they were unable to 
fi nd satisfactory places for their children to play 
football. There are also clubs within these which 
were formed by reform-minded coaches as they 
felt that they were unable to realize their concepts 
in the “traditionally” functioning clubs. This new 
type of association proved popular, and following 
the political transition many independent talent de-
velopment clubs were formed in many of the larger 
towns in Hungary.
It is clear based on both the specialist literature 
and our fi ndings that the positions of talent develop-
ment are best in the independent talent development 
(junior) clubs; these clubs have no senior teams and 
therefore all attention is paid to the youth (András, 
2003, 2004). The status of the newly formed junior 
clubs is the least productive in the entire structure 
as they cannot count on local government sponsor-
ship and they have no playing fi eld (stadium). Nev-
ertheless their talent development goals coincide 
with those of the professional clubs. As the major-
ity of these clubs was established by reform-minded 
people, the aim to raise and train “quality” players 
is present in almost all of them. It is for this reason 
that these clubs are noticeably market-orientated: 
their membership fees are somewhat higher in com-
parison to the other clubs, although they endeavour 
to provide quality training because it is important 
to them that their players achieve high ranking. As 
these clubs endeavour to manage football as a busi-
ness it is these organizations which function the 
most professionally in the entire structure. 
The effect of the political transition on 
talent development
According to our interviews, one of the most 
important factors in Hungary’s lag in football tal-
ent development is weakness in management. It is 
important to show what characterized this activity 
in talent development in the past. In the interest of 
a better understanding of the question the combined 
effect of the following historical and managerial 
factors on football are constructed in thesis form. 
Earlier we mentioned that the political transi-
tion brought about a negative development due to 
the fact that the state basically withdrew from the 
sponsorship of talent development on a wider scale. 
It is suffi cient here to refer to the collapse and at-
rophy of the competition system within the school 
system. 
By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990s, the need for a manager-type coach was 
brought to the fore also in the fi eld of talent devel-
opment. In many areas of the world, regardless of 
whether a country is rich or poor, this question was 
given high priority with regard to talent develop-
ment. In Hungary there was a plan to address the 
issue. Project leaders were named but, as it turned 
out, they were insuffi cient for the task at hand. This 
may be explained by the fact that the clubs, which 
were virtually left to their own devices, as the or-
ganisations responsible for development and real-
izing talent entrusted the matter of talent devel-
opment to aging players who had very little or no 
background and practice in the fi eld of management 
and coaching.
In addition the club managers thought they were 
thus able to hit two birds with one stone by provid-
ing an income for successful former players while 
at the same time exploiting their names to obtain 
children and sponsors. It may be clearly stated, how-
ever, that this concept proved fruitless in all aspects 
for developing talent. 
Here we come to the point in which we could 
speak ironically of “the Hungarian football mira-
cle” if the situation were not so dire. The real prob-
lem, which has a constant effect, occurs when tal-
ent development at a mass level is organized outside 
of the school system, and, in time, outside of the 
clubs as well. The latter occurs when the reduction 
of fi nancial resources and other conditions brings 
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with it the appearance of such “saviours”, who see 
a business opportunity in selling ever younger play-
ers from youth development programmes. 
A “modern day traffi c in children” has begun, 
the point of which is to sell untrained, barely trained 
or, in an optimal case, half-trained youth (the cat-
egory a given young player is assigned depends 
mainly on the age group) at home and abroad while 
at the same time some are provided to the given 
sport club section, thus legalizing their activity. 
Often the parent plays this role with their talented 
(or even untalented) child, which is at least under-
standable from a human perspective, but nonethe-
less extremely damaging to the sport. Even worse 
was the appearance and proliferation of the various 
“agents” who made the club directors and the par-
ents believe that they would be able to make a good 
business deal out of the sale of the players. Most of 
these agents quickly targeted ever younger players 
because there they encountered the weakest resist-
ance and the least amount of control or account-
ability. This destructive activity is still to this day 
clearly the most dangerous burden weighing on the 
youth talent development programmes.
In a normal case the training of managers takes 
years and is carried out at a university level because 
it requires complex knowledge which integrates a 
great amount of theoretical and practical scholar-
ship. In Hungarian football, however, the “worn-
out fi ghters” were given a crash-course after which 
they were given a fi eld-marshal’s baton, i.e. they 
were named talent development coaches. The basic 
manager training operated by the Hungarian Foot-
ball Federation provides an opportunity within two 
months for the pursuit of the activity at a high level 
and in an ethical manner. Going further, allow us to 
put forth a legitimate question: can we talk of man-
ager-type coaches when Hungarian football neither 
wants to train them nor employ them?
Experience shows that in Hungary this role in 
general is confi ned to the case in which manag-
ers endeavour to improve the performance of chil-
dren of well-off parents because then the parents 
will in some way or another support the team and 
perhaps the coach as well. This is the triumph of 
counter-selection. In the past there were three or 
four patronized players in a team of twenty, today 
this ratio seems to be reversed. In addition, in many 
cases talented, or seemingly talented players of 15-
17 years of age try their luck abroad. In this way 
there are few left worth managing. The circle is thus 
slowly closed, because there is no trained manager, 
and there is scarcely anyone worth managing in the 
world of Hungarian football. 
There remains a thread left in the story worth 
following. The signifi cant reduction in those em-
ployed in youth development programmes and the 
removing of these individuals from the school sys-
tem has greatly reduced the number and role of 
physical education teachers in talent development. 
At the same time in the 1980s the well-trained phy-
sical education teacher-coaches possessing modern 
knowledge were displaced in the adult echelon by 
the “star players”. The formula was born, which no 
one has proved scientifi cally but it sounded good, 
according to which “a person can be a good coach 
only if he was formerly a great player.” 
From here it was only a short step to the present 
dilettantish view which proclaims that it is not a 
problem in football if fewer children play it as in any 
case the quality of the training needs to be raised 
and then everything will be all right. Practice and 
theory in Hungary were harmonized, few play foot-
ball but from those who do we will develop the new 
“golden team”. How wide the foundation is and how 
many children play football do not count because 
the result inevitably does not occur. 
The political transition in essence buried the 
old structure of talent development, and brought 
little from the essential elements to the new. The 
state naturally is unable to, nor should it completely 
withdraw from the fi eld of talent development from 
one day to the next. Rather it attempts to fi nd co-
operative partners, who are able to add to the 
dwindling resources, or incorporate new, external 
resources. 
Every new situation brings with it new ideas, 
new concepts and recommendations for solutions. 
Naturally, this is true for exploring the possibility 
for football talent development programmes as 
well. The relative popularity in Hungary of football 
(participation in the 1982 and 1986 World Cups) 
for many enhanced the opportunity for founding 
an enterprise for talent development promising 
profi t.
There are talent development clubs in Western 
Europe which maintain themselves by selling play-
ers. This is a straight business enterprise, in which 
the fi nancial or expert investor risks the venture 
capital in the hope of future profi t. Naturally, there 
were such ventures in Hungary as well.
Góliát Football Club 
One of the new concepts was to form a training 
system organized on the school system. The fi rst 
such concept realized was Góliát FC. The activity 
of the organization began at the same time as the 
political transition (fi ve private individuals founded 
it in May of 1988), and therefore it is worth sum-
marizing what goals it set out and what it has been 
able to achieve in football talent development.
Góliát FC’s main activity: within the framework 
of primary and secondary schools, for the entire 
school year it provides regular play and training 
sessions, in addition three times a year within the 
framework of football athletic activity, the oppor-
tunity for competition and selection. The associa-
tion, from the time of its foundation, has built its 
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programmes on the social importance of teaching 
children a healthy lifestyle, learning to enjoy play 
and football, the traditions of Hungarian football, 
producing players to replace the greatly reduced 
number of players as well as on ensuring the con-
ditions of coaching football within the school. 
With an excellent concept the association wishes 
to build on the potentials within the school, utilizing 
the need for physical activity inherent within 
children in such a way that these are combined 
with the traditions of Hungarian football while at 
the same time providing the opportunity for regular 
training, competition and talent selection within the 
framework of the school. Between 1988 and 1999 
the association carried out its activities based on 
a co-operation agreement with the Hungarian 
Football Federation. It is a fact furthermore that the 
association, now operating under the name Góliát-
McDonald’s FC received state support from the Fall 
of 1999 to the end of 2004. The club’s budget by 
2004 surpassed 100 million HUF (1 USD = 200 
HUF). It is important to emphasize that according 
to offi cial documents, in 1988 2,700 children were 
members of the club, this number in 2002 reached 
40,364 and in the 2006/2007 school year 21,013 
girls and boys aged from 5 to 14 were members of 
Góliát-McDonald’s. 
According to the offi cial report of the Club it 
has provided regular sport activity for more than 
150,000 children, among them during the past 18 
years more than 15,000 children have been allo-
cated free of charge to football club sections. From 
these children 7 have become members of the na-
tional team. The report is excellent for understand-
ing why this formation is a dead end, and also it 
illuminates the fact that a good basic idea on its 
own is worthless if it is not paired with the neces-
sary expertise. 
The system covering the country and integra-
ting those secondary schools which applied to the 
programmes (1,073 schools in 2002) showed a 
10% effi ciency rate (15,000 from 150,000) in the 
orientation of students to the football club sections. 
This means two things. First, the preparation of 
the children did not reach the standard which the 
junior leagues would require, therefore serious 
expert problems could be present. Taking into 
consideration that the club provided expert mate-
rials (video and written materials on football) to 
each coach, all of whom possessed the required 
educational background, the possibility arises that 
the advertised training was not held properly, or 
perhaps not held at all. Second, the children who 
were involved in the training did not show much 
motivation in pursuing a football career or the 
selection of these children was not satisfactory, 
although the latter is disputed by the fact that a 
child aged 5 to 7, if properly taught, by the time 
he/she is 12 to 13 years old that child will be at 
such a level that he/she will be able to hold their 
own anywhere. 
It is well known that it is in Hungary that the 
most national team players do not last for fi ve 
international games on the national team. This 
makes more interesting the contrast of a total of 7 
out of 150,000 players making the national team. 
The most signifi cant assessment and indication of 
the success of the talent development programmes 
are how many players familiar with football from a 
given organization enter a senior team network, and 
how many become national team members. One can 
refer to the fact that the association made only the 
fi rst steps to help them achieve their goal, to learn to 
enjoy the sport, but even so, the 0.0047% percentage 
is alarming. It is also worth noting that for 11 years 
the Hungarian Football Federation (HFF) aided the 
club’s work in every fi eld, i.e. it was given profes-
sional, organizational and fi nancial support. The 
proportional results, however, are lacking.
Bozsik Programme 
The second type of talent development pro-
grammes is the Bozsik Programme which was 
initiated in 2001 and which was constructed upon 
three elements: 1) football in school: getting ac-
quainted with and learning to enjoy the game, 2) 
club football: the training of talented players, and 
3) the academy of elite players: the selection of the 
best from club training, the development of elite 
players. 
Based on these three elements they planned and 
advertised for the involvement of a minimum of 
100,000 new football players and targeted a long-
term goal of 240,000 players. It is of interest, how-
ever, that in the third year of the programmes there 
were 100,000 players in the programmes.
The school programme providing the founda-
tion for talent development targeted the participa-
tion of children between 6 and 11 years of age. This 
was realized within the Góliát McDonald’s FC sys-
tem in such a manner that the programme provided 
sessions on the teaching of and learning to enjoy 
football two to three times a week within the school 
system. Competition between the children does not 
appear here yet as a goal as this would be unneces-
sary and expensive. For this purpose they wished to 
use the competitions of the Student Olympics. The 
problem with this, however, is that the Student Ol-
ympics provides for competition primarily for the 
11-12 age group, i.e. that from the six age groups 
targeted for participation the fi rst fi ve were exclud-
ed from the competition. The second question was 
in this case to which programme do the school ac-
tivities go to the Góliát McDonald’s FC, or to the 
Bozsik Programme? Perhaps both associations ac-
counted for the same child? The third question is 
who instructs the children in the school? Obvious-
ly if this is realized under the Góliát system then 
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where does the Bozsik Programme come in? The 
suspicion from our interviewees arises that names 
are bought for 2,000 forint head money, which may 
be written into the report and to which they may re-
fer as participants in the programme, only they are 
dealt with separately and their activities are carried 
out in other organizations. 
The backbone of the Bozsik Programme is the 
club activities. The U7 lower district, the U9 lower 
district and subcenter, the U11 lower district, sub-
center and county players were selected. The U13 
age group is provided a competition opportunity 
within district, county and regional athletic teams. 
The training and competition of the age groups 
between U15 and U19 takes place within the fi rst 
and second league. The clubs participating in the 
programme must have a four-year talent develop-
ment programme, which the HFF Professional and 
Coach Management Centre oversees, in which the 
detailed explanation of participation in the Bozsik 
Programme must be represented. 
It is worth noting that the third element of the 
Bozsik Programme was not carried out. This was 
due to a professional review of the programme on 
the one hand, and on the other hand, to sponsors 
backing out. Similarly to our interviews, one of 
the prominent researchers of Hungarian sport 
science (Szegedi, 2003) found that schools and 
sport associations clearly formed the foundation 
of the programme but at the same time it often 
happened that the children were registered twice 
as participants in the programme: as school children 
and as association players. In addition it was clear 
that the integrated competition system counted 
as the greatest merit of the programme which in 
theory made it possible for the most talented and 
most motivated children to participate in the most 
intense and highest quality training, and thus, in 
time, to reach a higher level.
Whose interest?
The programme, in providing an opportunity 
for the children to advance, would have provided a 
relevant solution to the organizational problems of 
Hungarian football. One aspect, however, was left 
out from the principles of the programme: the in-
terest of the association. A number of small clubs 
were afraid that they would lose their talented play-
ers at a very young age and therefore they tried to 
“conceal” their best players. The programme ac-
cording to Szegedi (2003) was based exclusively 
on the interests of “universal Hungarian football”, 
forgetting that there are individual (club) interests, 
which were expressly harmed by the logic of the 
programme.
Knowing the facts it is easy to see that the 
main problem of the programme lies in its stated 
goals: it wished to realize mass and quality training 
within the same centrally directed framework, 
under the same direction. Experience shows that 
this does not work because activities directed at a 
wide foundation require organization on different 
principles and different conditions than successful 
work with selected talented players. The lack of 
success in the Bozsik Programme is a proof that 
money, and money alone, and, with regard to foot-
ball talent development a great deal of money, is 
not a guarantee for success. 
Other than the Góliát and Bozsik programmes 
there were other initiatives, but either due to their 
fi nancial background, or to their sphere of infl u-
ence, or to their results they were unable to pro-
vide experience which would have warranted their 
presentation. The conclusions related to the afore-
mentioned two programmes relate to these pro-
grammes as well.
The two models presented previously constitute 
the defi nitive experiments of the past 20 years in the 
fi eld of football talent development in the search for 
new directions and methods, and for new organiza-
tional forms capable of replacing the sport school 
system within the new circumstances. What the as-
sessed new formations have in common is that they 
targeted reaching and activating the mentioned age 
groups, so that from these participants they would 
be able to select the talent which would mean the 
beginning of an upward trend in Hungarian foot-
ball. The experiments proved to be basically un-
successful, although they were met with great ex-
pectations and, compared to other initiatives, they 
received a serious amount of funding.
Assessing the political transition and its 
consequences in football 
The consequences of the changes in the period 
since the political transition were expressed in six 
prominent subject areas which appeared in the 
course of interviewing the individuals taking part in 
the study in relation to football talent development. 
Some of these fi ndings well coincide with those of 
earlier studies (András, 2003; Freyer, 2004; Földes-
iné & Gál, 2005; Szegedi, 2003; Vincze, 2006).
First, the appeal of the sport has declined 
greatly. Although many still play football in 
Hungary and it is evident that great anticipation 
precedes every match, it is apparent that the interest 
by both adults and young people in football has 
fallen. Those leading the sport as well as the 
clubs should be responsible for not allowing the 
press surrounding football to be full of scandals, 
violence and “unsolved affairs”. This type of press 
often produces aversion even in those devoted to 
the sport. 
Also, the integration of the clubs into society 
seems to be a paramount problem. Football clubs 
to this day have failed to form satisfactory ties with 
their members and base, i.e. they have been unable 
to function as civic organizations. The clubs are not 
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suffi ciently transparent, their operation is virtually 
invisible to the outside world.
Another determining aspect is the facilities 
requirements. Many of the football pitches are in 
poor condition and there is a decline in pitches in 
general although the issue of football pitches is one 
of the most pressing problems facing football talent 
development. The state of the stadiums does a great 
deal of harm to the popularity of football, but the 
situation is perhaps even worse when one looks at 
the number and state of the training pitches: today 
children and young players train in conditions 
which in the 21st century do more to intimidate 
than to attract young people. 
In addition, the state of the professionals (talent 
development trainers) in the fi eld is rather poor. The 
majority of the trainers involved with young players 
do so for pay as a second job. Apart from this, ide-
ally it would be the task of not only the Hungarian 
University for Physical Education or the Hungarian 
Football Federation to teach coaches new fi ndings 
in coaching theory, nutrition, etc.
Another consequence is that the intermediary 
mechanisms between the various types of organiza-
tions function poorly. Co-operation between clubs 
is incidental, there are no professional contacts, it 
remains an unresolved problem as to how it would 
be worth it for the smaller associations to develop 
football talent. Due to the lack of organized rela-
tionships and to the poor operation of intermedi-
ary channels, nearly 40,000 football players at the 
age for talent development remained not reached 
by quality talent development training. 
Moreover, the intermediary mechanisms be-
tween football and other social subsystems do 
not always function effi ciently. Although in many 
places clubs cultivate good relations with the 
local governments and schools, the funding for 
sport activities by the local government remains 
at an extremely low level in many regions and 
communities. Even less resolved is the role of the 
state in football talent development, and in the area 
as a whole.
The lack and insuffi cient functioning of an 
intermediary sphere is an outstanding problem. It 
seemed clear in the course of the interviews that 
suffi cient mediation and connections would mean 
an effi cient operation of talent development. In 
Hungary the relationships between amateurs and 
professionals have not been suffi ciently developed 
although in most cases the clubs co-operate in 
a spontaneous manner. In regions where talent 
development for professional football functions 
poorly (therefore they are unable to organize their 
own training), and where amateur teams consider 
football purely a recreational activity (and they 
do not consider it their function to promote the 
professional career of their best young players) 
organized relationships between professional and 
amateur clubs are unlikely to form. Relationships 
work much better in regions where there are inde-
pendent talent development clubs as they are 
organizations which were formed expressly for 
the purpose of providing quality training for young 
players. These clubs are the ones which train their 
players for achievement. 
Today it is evident that many elite teams are – 
now traditionally – endeavouring to produce more 
talent which they have developed themselves. These 
elite clubs maintain far more active ties with the 
smaller clubs in their area.
Discussion and conclusions
The major European clubs have been developing 
vertically integrated networks in order to compete 
effectively in the global football market (King, 
2003). It does not seem to be the case in Hungary. 
Several researchers (Földesiné, 1996c; Laskai, 
1997; Takács, 1996) agree that the political parties 
following the political transition have for all intents 
and purposes not established their own networks 
and sport policy or governing strategy. Instead 
the parties simply assumed the central governing 
concept which has proved a failure, and which was 
later associated to political personalities (Hamar, 
Peters, Van Berlo, & Hardman, 2006). The perso-
nality-based government from the beginning battled 
(successfully) with the grass-roots development of 
the sport profession and although it succeeded in 
bringing about the 1996 Act on Sport, this was not 
supported by a suffi cient funding structure and 
therefore the paternalistic sport policy remained 
and was not replaced by sport featuring in the state 
central budget (Földesiné, 2003). All these aspects 
have greatly affected today’s football. 
One of the most important concepts related to 
football talent development is to reintegrate talent 
development into the school system, primarily in 
relation to the 6- to 12-year-old age group. Based 
upon our fi ndings, selection for club talent develop-
ment teams should take place at age of13. 
It should be also highlighted as imperative that 
the establishment of a network to cover the entire 
country, which 1) would be coupled with a mod-
ern training programme, and 2) the state would 
provide the basic funding, and, fi nally, 3) a central 
governing body would carry out the development 
of trained talent. 
Another key point in talent development is that 
“football school” should be organized by a promi-
nent talent development specialist to which parents 
would pay an appropriate membership fee. Also, the 
facilities should be provided in some form free of 
charge to co-operating partners (the state, co-oper-
ating clubs, local government, etc.) who would then 
be relieved of most of the burden of talent develop-
ment. The remaining costs would be covered by the 
sale of the players. This assumes, or rather requires, 
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the involvement of an investor or a sponsor because 
the most of the clubs would not have any remaining 
resources to cover the residual costs.
It would be also essential that a talent develop-
ment programme fi nanced by one or more spon-
sors, in which the parents also contribute to cover-
ing the costs of the programme, and which has a 
goal or system of goals that is socially justifi able 
or worthy of support within its operation, thereby 
basically acting as a civil initiative.
Talent development in Hungary is being carried 
out in undeserving circumstances (there scarcely re-
mains a base in the country truly suitable for quality 
training!) and has been entwined with business. A 
good example of this peculiar formation is that now 
parents are being asked to pay for sport activities 
which had been provided free of charge for decades 
(and they were choosy from the outset, so that to-
day youth sport activity has become the privilege of 
the rich!). Another example, coaches accept money 
from parents to favour their children, thereby con-
tinuing and reinforcing the peculiar counter-selec-
tion which is destroying the sport. At the same time 
the funding of sport has developed to the point at 
which very few put very little into “the big pot”, but 
even more put nothing in and still do so today.
In light of the opinions voiced by those in-
volved, the professionals and the prominent rep-
resentatives of the sport, we may offer the follow-
ing summary.
Becoming acquainted with and learning to en-
joy football in schools should be built fi rst and fore-
most by physical education teachers and should aim 
at the 6- to 13-year-old age group and not have the 
children of this age group train outside the school 
structure at external football associations. Within 
the school framework every child showing an inter-
est should receive the opportunity to master the ba-
sics of the sport, to become acquainted with his/her 
own skills and talents and to practice regularly.
The funding (at times signifi cant) allocated to 
football talent development was used poorly and 
ineffi ciently because if money entered the system, 
it was used fi rst to build and fi nance a national net-
work, thereby leaving little left to develop and bring 
to a competition talent. The 2004 annual budget of 
the Bozsik Programme bears out this conclusion. 
The Hungarian Football Federation prescribes 
a list of tasks for the associations (primarily for the 
fi rst and the second league) for which it is unable to 
provide fi nancial support. The other problem is that 
the Federation expects continual training of talent 
from the associations while at the same time it takes 
out talented players (selected team members) from 
the associations’ preparation and training system 
for long periods of time in order to prepare adult 
team members. In the event of failure the opportu-
nity is a given to pass the burden of responsibility. 
It is a serious problem in attitude that they wish to 
assign football talent development mainly to the 
45-50 fi rst and second league clubs which, taking 
into account the 14- to 18-year-old age group, this 
means at most 5,000 players. This naturally does 
not lead easily to the desired and hoped for ad-
vancement of Hungarian football to the European 
front line. The events and lack of success of the 
past 20 years clearly show that we are heading in 
the wrong direction. It is time to approach the is-
sue of talent development in Hungarian football in 
a different manner. 
Learning and understanding the Hungarian is-
sues and problems, it might be interesting for oth-
er countries to make their own talent development 
programme better. The fi nancial, political and sport 
matters may be different for each country but the 
goal is similar: make youth football better and more 
popular in society. Hopefully, all those interested 
may fi nd useful ideas to adapt for their own situ-
ations. 
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Prezentacija nacionalnih sportskih politika i 
odgovarajuće promišljanje mogućih pravaca razvo-
ja te njihova sustavna usporedba zajedno mogu biti 
uistinu dovoljno snažni temelji za razumijevanje sa-
dašnjeg stanja sporta u različitim državama. Čak ni 
u razvijenijim zemljama ne postoje vladine sportske 
strategije, politike ni koncepti koje bi zainteresirane 
zemlje mogle automatski preuzeti. 
Čini se da mađarski sport, u stanju u kojem se 
danas nalazi, nije sposoban funkcionirati neovisno, 
tj. bez potpore države. Mađarska se već godinama 
ne uspijeva kvalificirati na velika međunarodna na-
tjecanja u klasičnim sportovima koji privlače gle-
datelje (nogomet, košarka, tenis); najbolji rezultati 
postižu se u sportovima koji su manje interesantni 
medijima i sponzorima, kao što su kajak-kanu, ma-
čevanje i moderni pentatlon. 
Danas je nogomet kod djece u Mađarskoj po-
stao sasvim novi popularan fenomen i, štoviše, po-
staje općeprihvaćen (u 1990-ima) od kada je postao 
profesionalan sport. 
Cilj je našeg istraživanja ispitati napredak i ka-
rakteristike mađarskog nogometa i razvoj nogome-
tnih talenata nakon političkih promjena. Budući da 
je politička tranzicija donijela kritične promjene u 
odnosima između sporta i društva, naš je cilj bio 
istražiti profesionalne, ekonomske, socijalne i so-
ciopolitičke učinke, osobito na razvoj talenata u 
najpopularnijem sportu u zemlji - nogometu. Na 
temelju ove studije zacrtali smo i cilj da skiciramo, 
premda vrlo oprezno, kakva bi mogla biti perspek-
tiva ovog sporta. 
Metode 
Kvalitativna studija je ispitivanje značenja i ot-
krivanje; stoga smo se, u našoj studiji, radeći na te-
renu, analizirajući dokumente i vodeći vrlo detaljne 
intervjue, fokusirali na značenja određenih stvari 
i na to kako su utjecale na razvoj talenata u ma-
đarskom nogometu. Istovremeno su se prikupljali 
i analizirali kvalitativni podaci, potom su se integri-
rali i tako se stvarala mreža podataka i značenja 
tijekom čitavog procesa. Prvi autor ove studije, kao 
sudjelujući promatrač, živio je i dalje živi unutar no-
gometne zajednice te je direktno i trajno vezan za 
njene dnevne aktivnosti.
Reguliranje i upravljanje sportom proizvodi ve-
liku količinu dokumenata, među kojima smo našli 
interesantne i vrlo važne izvore, kao što su odlu-
ke, zakoni, računi, zapisnici sa sastanaka odbora 
koji su uzeti u obzir u našem istraživanju. Odluke 
o pravcu i razvoju sporta na svim razinama bile su 
važne za naše istraživanje. 
Vrlo istaknute, pouzdane profesionalne djela-
tnike s dugogodišnjim iskustvom u sportu izabrali 
smo za provedbu detaljnih intervjua: 14 profesiona-
laca (trenera, ligaških kapetana), 6 bivših ravnate-
lja Mađarskog nogometnog saveza (HFF) (navede-
ni ravnatelji odigrali su odlučujuće uloge u razvoju 
ovog sporta) i tri nogometne “žive legende”. Sve 
smo intervjue snimali. 
Rezultati
Razvoj talenata u Mađarskoj provodi se u ne-
dopustivo lošim uvjetima (u državi jedva da postoji 
mjesto na kojem se uistinu mogu provoditi kvalite-
tni treninzi), a čudno je prepleten s poslovima. Do-
bar primjer ovog vrlo čudnog oblika rada jest da se 
od roditelja zahtijeva da od sada plaćaju sportske 
aktivnosti svoje djece koje su bile besplatne dese-
tljećima unatrag (te su djeca prolazila kroz priro-
dnu selekciju talenata od samog početka; danas je, 
međutim, trening djece i mladih postao privilegija 
bogatih). Drugi primjer loše prakse u sportu djece 
i mladih je taj što treneri uzimaju novac od roditelja 
kako bi forsirali njihovu djecu da bi uspjela u tom 
sportu; time se podupire poseban oblik protu-se-
lekcije, čime se uništava sam sport. Istovremeno, 
sustav financiranja se razvio do točke u kojoj vrlo 
rijetki pridonose financiranju sporta. 
Prvo upoznavanje s nogometom i učenje kako 
u njemu uživati trebalo bi se najprije i ponajviše do-
goditi u školama pod vodstvom nastavnika tjelesne 
i zdravstvene kulture te bi takvi programi trebali pri-
je svega obuhvatiti djecu u dobi od 6 do 13 godina 
koja ne bi trebala trenirati izvan školskih programa, 
odnosno u sportskim klubovima. U okviru školskih 
programa svako bi dijete zainteresirano za sport 
trebalo dobiti priliku za usvajanje i usavršavanje 
osnova određenog sporta kako bi i samo upozna-
lo svoje sposobnosti i talente te steklo naviku da 
redovito vježba. 
Financijska sredstva (ponekad značajna) do-
dijeljena za razvoj nogometnih talenata malo i 
neučinkovito su se koristila u navedene svrhe jer 
se novac koji je ušao u sustav najprije koristio za 
izgradnju i financiranje nacionalne mreže, te je na 
taj način ostajalo vrlo malo za razvoj talenata i nji-
hova natjecanja.
Ozbiljan je problem i stajalište Mađarskog nogo-
metnog saveza koji sredstva za razvoj nogometnih 
talenata želi podijeliti između 45-50 klubova prve i 
druge savezne lige, koji ukupno imaju najviše 5000 
igrača, uzmu li se u obzir igrači u dobi od 14 do 18 
godina. Takva politika Saveza, naravno, ne vodi 
željenom napretku mađarskog nogometa i pribli-
žavanju najjačim europskim klubovima. Događaji i 
nedostatak uspjeha u posljednjih 20-ak godina ja-
sno pokazuju da se krećemo u pogrešnom smjeru. 
Vrijeme je da se problemu razvoja talenata u ma-
đarskom nogometu pristupi na drugačiji način. 
UČINCI POLITIČKIH PROMJENA U MAĐARSKOJ 1989.-1990. 
NA RAZVOJ I TRENIRANJE NOGOMETNIH TALENATA 
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Diskusija i zaključci
Jedan od najvažnijih koncepata vezanih uz ra-
zvoj nogometnih talenata jest da bi se razvoj tale-
nata trebao ponovno vratiti u školski sustav, prven-
stveno za djecu u dobi od 6. do 12. godine. Teme-
ljeno na rezultatima naših istraživanja, selekcija za 
daljnji razvoj talenata unutar klubova trebala bi biti 
organizirana za djecu stariju od 13 godina. 
Također bi kao imperativ trebalo naglasiti uspo-
stavljanje mreže koja bi prekrila cijelu državu i koja 
bi: 1) radila u skladu s modernim trenažnim progra-
mima, 2) kojoj bi država osigurala osnovna finan-
cijska sredstva za rad i, naposljetku, 3) osnovalo bi 
se centralno upravno tijelo koje bi provodilo razvoj 
treniranih talenata.
Sljedeći ključni detalj u razvoju talenata je da bi 
“nogometne škole” trebali organizirati i voditi istak-
nuti specijalisti za razvoj nogometnih talenata ko-
jima bi roditelji plaćali odgovarajuću članarinu za 
svoju djecu. Isto tako, objekti za treninge trebali bi 
biti besplatni za takve organizacije uz pomoć drža-
ve, suradnih klubova, lokalne samouprave i drugih), 
koje bi u tom slučaju bile oslobođene velikog finan-
cijskog tereta. Ostali troškovi pokrivali bi se proda-
jom igrača. Takav način rada pretpostavlja ili, bolje 
rečeno, zahtijeva uključivanje investitora ili sponzo-
ra, budući da većina klubova ne bi imala dovoljno 
sredstava za pokrivanje preostalih troškova. 
Bilo bi jako važno da program razvoja talenata 
financira jedan ili više sponzora te da ga pomažu i 
roditelji pokrivanjem određenih troškova. Tako or-
ganiziran programa rada, s jasno iskazanim ciljem 
ili ciljevima rada, bio bi socijalno opravdan i vrijedan 
truda i potpore za svoje akcije, stoga bi na taj način 
zapravo mogao djelovati kao udruga građana. 
Upoznavanje i razumijevanje mađarskih proble-
ma moglo bi biti interesantno za ostale zemlje kako 
da učine svoj program razvoja talenata još boljim. 
Financijska, politička i sportska pitanja mogu biti 
drugačija za svaku državu, ali cilj je u osnovi sličan: 
učiniti nogomet djece i mladih boljim i popularnijim 
u društvu. Nadamo se da će svi zainteresirani za 
ovu problematiku pronaći korisne ideje koje bi mogli 
primijeniti u svojim specifičnim situacijama. 
